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TOP SECRET

TICOM/D-4

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT ITEMS FROM

THE WAR DIARY OF OKL/GEN. NAFUE. 3 ABT.,

JUNE 1944 to APRIL 1945

The attached paper consists of a summary of selected items from TICOM Document T 1408, B 41, one of the files containing the War Diary of the G.A.F. Sigint Service, and covering the period June 1944 to April 1945.

The original document was obtained by a TICOM Team from the G.A.F. Headquarters at Strub-Berchtesgaden.

TICOM
13 July 1945

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Survey of TICOM document T 1408, B 44.
"Kriegstagebuch No.2 (3. abt.), Anlage 1, Horchdienst."

This is one of a number of Files containing the War Diary of OKL/ Gen.Nafue. 3 Abt. (Sigint. Service of the G.A.F.), but the only volume dealing with "Horchdienst" (i.e. Sigint. Service directed against Allied Air Force signals, as opposed to 'noises'); it contains nothing on cryptoanalysis and little of interest to TICOM. It is thought that TICOM may be served by the following:

a) Summary of selected items.

b) Brief preliminary summary of items worthy of translation.

c) Survey of remainder.

The volume contains the KTB (Kriegstagebuch) filing copy of a large number of orders, directives etc., originated in the offices of Gen. Nafue. 3 Abt. between June '44 and April '45. The vast majority are signed by Obstltn. FRIEDRICH (head of 3 Abt.), some however by Gen. MARTINI (Gen.Nafue) and some by FRIEDRICH's subordinates. The index at the front is incomplete. The pages are numbered in the bottom left hand corner. There is a KTB file serial (red pencil) at the top right (ceasing at 16/3/45, No.300 - the point at which the index ceases). There are 574 pages in the volume. The items summarised below are indicated by Order No, date, (file No, page in file, for items category b, above).

A. Summary of selected items.

1) Organisation of G.A.F. Sigint units.

GOERING orders of Autumn 1944 for the unification of command over all G.A.F. Sigint units resulted in a complete (paper) reorganisation whereby all previous Sigint units (Horch, jamming, route-tracking) emerged as units of:

LN Rgts 180 (West)
181 (South East)
182 (East)
186 (Norway). (83252/44 of 20/9/44)

Note: This was apparently never implemented, as later correspondence shows the old organisation unchanged:

Fu.Ho.Rgt. West,
III/LN.Rgt. 3,
III/LN.Rgt. S.E.,
III/LN.Rgt. 2, 4, 1, 5.

A series of orders in October gives the latest (present) designations in the 350 series, with the old names in brackets, e.g.:

I/353 (9/LN.Rgt. 1)
I/351 (I/Fu. Ho. Rgt. West)
II/351 (III/LN. Rgt. 3)
III/351 (Fu. Aufkl. Abt. REICH) (83513/44, 13/10/44).

No order gives the whole list of correspondences between old and new nomenclature. There is however a complete order of battle of the units in the West attached to "Umgliederung des LN (Funkaufkl.) Rgts.351", as No.83946/44 of 20/11/44. This is all of historical interest only.

2) Last moves of G.A.F. Sigint units.

a) 1/LN.Rgt. 350 ordered to KRESSBRONN/LANGNARGEN on Lake Constance, from POTSDAM. (80359/44, 12/2/45)

Chi Stelle Ref C (Mediterranean) to PREISTAETTEN
" " " E (cryptanalysis) to KRESSBRONN. (81005/45 of 9/2/45).

Note: A later order required Chi Stelle O[illegible].d.L. (LN Abt. 350) to move to Munich (82233/45 of 12/4/45); but probably not implemented.

b) IN. Rgt. 352 (GAF Sigint, Mediterranean Theatre) under orders to move to KAMMER on the ATTERSEE, Austria. (81807/45 of 19/3/45).

c) There is a considerable number of orders for moves of Eastern front units: the most recent major moves are:

II/LN Rgt. 353 (attached to Lfl.6) to prepare to move to PILSEN area. (80716/45 of 8/4/45)
III/LN Rgt. 353 (attached Lfl.4) to prepare to move to LINZ-PASSAU area. (80717/45 of 8/4/45).

3) Changes in cover assignments and tasks.

a) The task "cipher developments and security scrutiny" (see TICOM/I-13, page 2) handed over to OKW/Chi. (82199/45 of 9/4/45).

b) Friedrich orders LN. Rgt. 351 to contact AK.z.b.V. to arrange details of cooperation between special weapons authorities and GAF Sigint. (Note: apparently to report Allied plotting of V-weapons). (80545/45 of 8/3/45).

c) GAF Sigint cover of United States traffics dropped on 30/3/45. "Interests of Director of Met. Services still to be watched." (82054/45 of 30/3/45).

d) Restriction of cover of following Air traffics, in order to free personnel for ground forces:

TURKEY, SWEDEN, AMERICA (trans-Atlantic ferry and all supply services): this would free 300 men. (80658/45 of 24/3/45)

Note: Amongst the items noted for translation are some which inform GAF Commands of the various limitations imposed on GAF Sigint by German withdrawals (from GREECE and Western EUROPE), see below.

4) Emergency cover.

a) IN. Rgts 352 (Mediterranean) and 353 (Eastern Front) warned to report at once on traffics indicating landing undertakings. (80512/45 of 4/3/45)

Note: the distribution (Med. and East) suggests a landing scare in the Southeastern area.

b) LN. Rgt. 351, LN.Abt. 356 and 357 (all Western area) received similar instructions in 16271/45 of 16/2/45.

c) Friedrich on 26/3/45 reminded LN. Rgts 352 (Med.), 353 (East) and LN. Abt. 355 (Norway) of orders of 6 and 8 Feb to report currently on all phenomena (particularly, brief 'Kommandosignale') on frequency band 4.5 - 6.0 and 100 - 300 megs. (81962/45 of 26/3/45).

5) Miscellaneous.

a) Some of the translatable items, below, deal with G.A.F. Sigint cover of the Russians. Friedrich authorised on 24/2/45 (80443/45) and again on 19/3/45 (80602/45) an Eastern Front "Lagefunk" (running commentary by W/T of Sigint raid plots). This seems to mean that towards the end of the war GAF Sigint in the East was being driven

on to the defensive, as it had long been in the West, and to associate itself rather with air raid reporting, than with Intelligence. Various minor items (announcement of warning systems for specific GAF operational formations) substantiate this view.

b) A number of items deal with the forecasting of Allied Raids. 80102/44 of 14/1/45 suggests that Jagdkorps II preferred six hours to four hours warning of U.S. 4-engined a/c raids. Friedrich's reply indicates that six hours' warning must be regarded as the exception, four the rule.

c) It is interesting to note that even the Sigint Service had to have authorisation before it could intercept ordinary radio bulletins of foreign countries. 815080/45 of 6/3/45 seeks authorisation of Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab Ic (Luftwesen - comment: a department of Ic also monitoring foreign broadcasts) for 11 men to listen to B.B.C. etc.

B. Advance Summary of items worth translation (or full résumé)

1) Document, File No.1/13, p.551, No.82389/44 of 5/7/44: O.K.W. authorises limited cooperation with Hungarian Sigint.

2) Document, File No.1/73, page 442, No.85860/44 of 28/8/44: Friedrich forwards the "Bulletin for the Sigint Service, 3. Series" (Mitteilungsblatt fuer die Funkaufklarung 3. Folge) with a covering note. The latter states that this publication (evidently appearing periodically) is not receiving due attention from units. Though intended for limited circulation (Geheim), it must be got to the specialists affected.

It is evidently a Bulletin dealing with the organisation of Sigint., experiments in interception, new signals equipment of the "enemy". The present number deals with:

a) Formation of a Specialist Detachment for W/T (Funktechnisches Sonderkommando), set up by Director of GAF Sigs. in collaboration with Director of GAF Technical Armament (Chef TLR), to cope with new signals equipment and navigational aids of the "enemy." It will have special M/T fitted with all kinds of intercept receivers, and specially equipped aircraft. Its present problem is BOMERANG (OBOE).

b) changes in GAF Sigint. unit subordination.

c) changes in war establishments of Sigint. units.

d) technical aspects of jamming.

e) problems of interception

i) German receivers

ii) U.S.A. Special W/T systems,
Teletype,
multiple teletype,
multiple morse,
Carrier frequency telegraphy,
(Wechselstrom Telegraphie)
} Technical and detailed.

(The translation of ii) will call for cooperation of technical experts.)

3) Documents i) File No.1/74, pages 440 sqq., of 31/8/44 (No B.B. Nr),

ii) File No.1/90a, pages 414 sqq., No.11462/44 of 4/9/44:

outline the limitations imposed on GAF Sigint. by German withdrawals and indicate what traffics can still be effectively covered. Compare 8), below.

4) Document, File No.1/116, page 350, No.83322/44 of 27/9/44:

Friedrich informs Gen. Nafue 2 Abt. (IV) of the signals insecurity of II/NJG 3.

5) Document, File No.1/125, page 341, No.83364/44 of 1/10/44:

Hptm. OELJESCHLAEGER passed to Chi Stelle Ref D details of W/T nets of the Polish resistance Air Force, asks for cover and priority treatment of the intercepts.
Comment: the "four enclosures" referred to in the text are not filed in the Diary. In the circumstances this note may suffice.

6) Document 1/126, page 339, No.83389/44 of 2/10/44:

A report submitted to Gen. Nafue. by Referat D. of Chi Stelle on the forecasting of Soviet Long Range Bomber incursions. Cover of weather recce. (2 - 3 hours before take off) rendered difficult by daily changing signals data - in fact raid forecasting almost impossible. Compare 13 below.

7) Document 1/194, page 245, No.84064/44 of 29/11/44.

Friedrich applies to Luftgau III for accommodation for Specialists to cope with U.S. teletype:

(Note: referred to as "F.F.5" and "F.F.6" traffics; F.F.5 and F.F.6 are according to contents of item 2 above teletype traffic: "for all such traffic roughly 50 symbols are needed; this total is reached by variously combining 6 'impulses and pauses' (FT6) - there is also the F.F.5 system which brings in the letter and figure shifts and manages with a 5 unit scheme.") "The solution of these systems is urgently necessary, but at present impossible without centralised interception and study. The reception station of LN. Abt. 350 at SCHOENFELD near BERLIN is no longer adequate as it can receive and work on only some of these traffics. The present SCHOENFELD installation consists of

a) 14 Rhombus installations (long and short wave)

b) a reception hut: 12 interception rooms, 7 stores rooms.

c) quarters for 40 men; present: 52 men."

Friedrich proposes to raise the strength to company level and requires quarters.

Note: Friedrich signed the above on 29/11/44. Should he, during the interrogations reported in TICOM/I 13 and 29, have remembered this story? It does not give him the lie direct: the 52 men experimenting at SCHOENFELD, and the measures he planned to improve the work done there, - he may have forgotten all about. He said work continued, which is true; that SCHOENFELD was not producing more than technical reports seems to be the answer. See also No. 11 below.

8) Document 1/202, pp.223 sqq, No.89376 of 5/12/44.

A report on the performance of GAF Sigint, as on 1/12/44 (subdivided according to geographical areas and modes of cover) e.g.:

a) Interception, Eastern Mediterranean:

i) cover assured of:

Ground organisation,
strength, order of battle, equipment,
deployment of flying formations,
A.L.O. networks.

ii) cover conditionally assured of:

Fighters,
Fighter control (distances too great).

b) Route-tracking (by areas).

c) Jamming, (by areas).

9) Document 1/204, pp.208 sqq., No. 84128/44 of 7/12/44:

Report to G.A.F. Command West explaining decreased exploitation of R.A.F. traffics. "Through circumstances known to you the R.A.F. became aware of the methods of G.A.F. Sigint. We were therefore obliged to adjust ourselves to the changed, disciplined employment of high-frequency techniques which followed immediately afterwards." "New reconnaissance methods cannot be produced to order. We are working under special difficulties: you know that the British have reduced to a minimum the use of high frequency systems in the approach area (Vorfeld) and are moreover employing extensive feint manoeuvres." "We are doing our best .....We warn you that if the Americans also improve their signals discipline there will be further increase in the difficulties of route tracking."

The tables which follow indicate the preliminary warnings of R.A.F. night raids given during the period 5/11 - 2-3/12/44 (they call for specialists' analysis).

Note: There are other items warning operational commands that Sigint. may at any time receive setbacks from which it will not immediately, or necessarily, recover.

10) Document 1/231, p. 171, No.80102/44 of 14/1/45. See A 5 b, above.

11) Document 1/249, p.147, No.80773/45 of 30/1/45:

Friedrich orders LN Abt. 350 in KRESSBRONN (Lake Constance) to begin to work an F.F.5 set and intercept teletype traffics.

"Experiments and evaluation of results to be conducted in close cooperation with F.F.5 reception unit at SCHOENFELD." Note: Compare item 7 above.

12) Document 1/269, p. 119, No.80390/45 of 16/2/45:

A somewhat mysterious communication referring to previous verbal discussions of General MARTINI - Oberst. MORGENSTERN, Oberst. FORSTER and Oberstltn. FRIEDRICH (all G.A.F. Sigs. and Sigint.)

"In the event of the special contingency discussed arising, the following moves will take place (authorisation being first sought from OKL):"

a) Routetracking organisation to HEILIGENSTADT area.

b) Funkleitstand Ob..d.L. and elements of Chi Stelle of Ob. d.L. (Workshop) will also move into the HEILIGENSTADT area.
Note: which Heiligenstadt not specified.

c) LN. Abt. 356 to S. German area.

d) Meldekopf 3, BERLIN to HAMBURG.

Note: Presumably agreed moves in the event of BERLIN being threatened with encirclement

13) Document 1/273, page 113, no Number, 20/2/45:

Signed OELJESCHLAEGER. Subject, prediction of SOVIET incursions, (LR Bombers).

a) To be recognised from ground to ground traffic between Corps and Rgts., which may contain operational orders (cipher texts, readable).

b) Tuning traffic before take-off not picked up as yet. Only slight amount of keying traffic during flight up to main operational zone. (HKL). Every a/c on a special frequency in contact with Regiment W/T station. Daily changing frequencies. Wireless silence when a/c are in operational area. Traffic resumed on leaving ops. area.

c) E.g. Stettin raid of 20/2/45: Picked up at 1807 hours; warning given of direction at 1811 hours to Ref.D. Passed at 1850 by Ref D to route-trackers. No direct lines to latter available from original intercept unit.

d) G.A. and Fighter raids by formations near front picked up from R/T after take-off. (Reports passed direct to relevant GAF flying formations).

Note: above may suffice for this document.

C) Remainder

Many items dealing with personnel, unit strengths, minor moves of units and sub-units of the GAF Sigint. Service, particularly in the East. Reallocation of cover resulting from such moves. Items dealing with jamming and route-tracking units, equipment etc. Items dealing with D/F sets, units, sites.

Mr. Coulson (Professor Norman's section) has examined the file for items of particular interest to A.D.I. Science.